ed. 1912) [hereinafter cited as SEDGWICKI. It is also incorporated in the Restatement of Torts. 4 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 908 (1939) . But cf. "It is probable that, in the framing of a model code of damages to-day for use in a country unhampered by legal tradition, the doctrine of exemplary damages would find no place". MCCORMICK 276 (1935) .
5 Massachusetts, Nebraska, Washington, Louisiana, New Hampshire. In Indiana, punitive-exemplary damages may not be awarded if the defendant would be liable to criminal prosecution for the same offense. Stewart v. Maddox, 63 Ind. 51 (1878). A forceful opinion against the doctrine was written in Murphy v. Hobbs, 7 Colo. 541, 5 Pac. 119 (1884). This opinion was overturned by subsequent legislation, CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-2-2 (1953). Wisconsin, on the other hand, observes the doctrine, despite its disapproval thereof. The court suggested that the doctrine be rejected by legislation. Brown v. Swineford, 44 Wis. 282 (1878).
"Damages are given as a compensation or satisfaction to the plaintiff for an injury actually sustained by him from the defendant. They should be precisely commensurate with the injury, neither more nor less." 2 GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE 242 (2d ed. 1848). The foregoing rule of damages was quoted with approval in Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 2 Wash. 45, 51, 25 Pac. 1072, 1073 (1891). "The damages recovered are measured in all cases by the injury caused. Vindictive or punitive damages are never allowed in this State." Per Holmes, J., in Burt v. Advertiser Newspaper Co., 154 Mass. 238, 245, 28 N.E. 1, 5 (1891).
1
Although in the Roman, Civil, and Scottish law, punitive-exemplary damages appear to have been unknown,12 the doctrine has had a long history in the common law. It stems from the famous eighteenth century case of Huckle v. Money.1 3 In an attempt to suppress John Wilkes' journal, The North Briton, a general warrant, naming no person, was issued by the Secretary of State to arrest printers of the paper. The plaintiff, a journeyman printer, was seized and imprisoned for six hours under the warrant. A jury awarded damages of £ 300 against the arresting officer. The defendant, alleging excessive damages, moved for a new trial. In denying this application, Lord Chief Justice Pratt' 4 said:
The personal injury done to [the plaintiff] was very small, so that if the jury had been confined by their oath to consider the mere personal injury only, perhaps £ 20 damages would have been thought damages sufficient.., but the small injury done to the plaintiff, or the inconsiderableness of his station and rank in life did not appear to the jury in that striking light in which the great point of law touching the liberty of the subject appeared to them.... I think they have done right in giving exemplary damages. To enter a man's house by virtue of a nameless warrant, in order to procure evidence, is worse than the Spanish Inquisition; a law under which no Englishman would wish to live an hour; it was a most daring public attack upon the liberty of the subject.Is
Having affirmed the jury's right to award punitive-exemplary damages, Lord Chief Justice Pratt also acknowledged a limitation on the jury's freedom of action. 16 This limitation was adopted in a subsequent case' 7 when the court announced the conditions necessary for setting aside a jury's award: "the damages must be monstrous and enormous indeed, and such as all mankind must be ready to exclaim against, at first blush."18 With such vast latitude, however, the restriction on the jury's freedom of action was probably more theoretical than practical. When the court did not require the jury to confine itself to its "oath to consider the mere personal injury only," it permitted the invasion of the law of torts by concepts commonly associated with criminal proceedings, but not restrained by the traditional safeguards. When the court did not upset an award fifteen times larger than that deemed "sufficient," it sanctioned a novel, free-wheeling doctrine. The explanation must be found in the bitter struggle of the individual against the oppressive measures of George III and his ministers. 19 Men were battling fiercely to protect their liberty, their privacy, freedom of the press, and freedom from unrestricted search and seizure. The judges who were deeply committed to the supremacy of these principles allowed their strong personal political views to penetrate their judicial decisions.
2 0 Certain points are worth noting about these early cases. First, they expressly recognized the distinction between compensatory damages ("damages sufficient" or damages which are "a satisfaction to the injured person") and damages awarded specifically as punishment and as deterrent. Secondly, the award of punitive-exemplary damages was predicated on the invasion of primary "constitutional" rights 2 1 and not upon malice. In Huckle v. Money, there was no malice in the act of arrest. Indeed, it was effected in the course of defendant's official duty. Moreover, the plainiiff was in custody for about six hours and during that time he was "treated... well." 2 2 Originally the infamy of the act itself was the determinant in the 1 Id. at 250, 95 Eng. Rep. at 794. The verdict was justified by the court on the ground that it was an "extraordinary case which concerns the liberty of every one of the King's subjects." Sedgwick, however, suggests that the refusal of the court to set aside the jury's verdict resulted from "the lack of the power to do so." I SEDGWIcK 69. It is interesting to note that prior to making the statement quoted in the text, the court said: "There is not one single case (that is law) in all the books to be found, where the court has granted a new trial for excessive damages in actions for torts." 2 Wils. K.B. at 249, 95 Eng. Rep. at 793. Extremely large awards were not uncommon and were upheld. See Note, 70 HARv. L. REV. 519 (1957).
19 Lord Camden and Chatham, the Elder Pitt, were among the leading libertarians in the House of Lords. One of Lord Camden's earliest cases, as a member of the bar, involved his defense of a defendant accused of publishing a libel. He boldly insisted on the jury's right to judge both the law and the fact, an insistence which to the end of his life he strenuously and at last successfully maintained. 8 Foss, JUDGEs OF ENGLAND 358 (1864). 20 The arguments in the House of Lords between Lord Mansfield and Lord Chief Justice Pratt, among others, with respect to judicial decisions in which one or the other participated, reflected a lack of sensitivity and detachment which we have grown to expect from courts. award of punitive-exemplary damages. In time, however, a shift in emphasis occurred. The defendant's malice, wantonness, or conscious indifference to harmful consequences-whatever those grab-bag, question-begging epithets may mean-have become the indispensable conditions for an award beyond "damages sufficient." 23 The key question posed by this historical development is whether a concept generated by the struggle between an oppressive ruler and his subjects is appropriate in the clash of day-to-day living between individuals in a free and highly complex society; should tort liability based on personal motives and intentions be sanctioned in our turbulent, dynamic society ? 24 Thdse who have canonized the doctrine of punitive-exemplary damages as dogma-and they are in the great majority-do so in great part because it has the weight of authority. 25 They also contend that the quantum and severity of admonition or deterrence inherent in compensatory damages are insufficient to assure a stable, secure, and law-abiding society. 26 Damages must be supplemented when the defendant's conduct is malicious or wanton. 27 To buttress their position, the supporters of the doctrine cite those
23
The Restatement of Torts permits the award of punitive damages "to punish ... for ... outrageous conduct." §908 (1939). The subsequent explanation defines "outrageous conduct" as conduct involving "acts done with a bad motive or with a reckless indifference to the interests of others." § 908, comment b at 555 (1939). Punitive-exemplary damages were awarded in a case of trespass to land when the defendant's conduct was such as to disregard "every principle which actuates the conduct of gentlemen .... " Merest v. Harvey, 5 Taunt. 442, 443, 128 Eng. Rep. 761 (C.P. 1814). Such damages are justified in part as serving the function of revenge. Note, 70 HARv. L. Rav. 517, 525 (1957). It is difficult to justify any role for revenge in civil proceedings.
24 "[W]hen we are dealing with that part of the law which aims more directly than any other at establishing standards of conduct, we should expect there more than elsewhere to find that the tests of liability are external, and independent of the degree of evil in the particular person's motives or intentions." HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 50 (1881). "It remains to be proved that, while the terminology of morals is still retained, and while the law does still and always, in a certain sense, measure legal liability by moral standards, it nevertheless, by the very necessity of its nature, is continually transmuting these moral standards into external or objective ones, from which the actual guilt of the party concerned is wholly eliminated." Id. at 38. "[Any amount of malevolence on the defendant's part in and of itself would not enhance the amount the plaintiff recovered by a penny, and ... absolute good will would not cut it down." Per Holmes, J., in Burt v. 
27
Although it is generally recognized that the award of damages is essential to avoid the evil of private retribution, the controversy ranges on the quantum of damages. The sup-situations where the actual damages may be small but the need for admonition great, as when a man wantonly shoots into a crowd but actually injures no one. A prophylactic end is also served in those cases where one may find it economically advantageous to commit a wrong even though obliged to compensate the innocent plaintiff for the damage done. 28 As a subsidiary ground, it is urged that since an injured plaintiff may not recover all his legal expenses, a "malicious" wrongdoer should not be permitted with impunity to impose such a burden on an innocent plaintiff. 29 It is also urged that a plaintiff might not bring suit unless he could claim punitive-exemplary damages as well. 30 However, it is principally for the punitive and deterrent effects that the doctrine is supported as a sound, serviceable legal tool."
Despite the repeated ritualistic invocation of the term "deterrence," there is little reliable evidence to establish that punitive-exemplary damages do, in After four years of research, a traffic research authority concluded that "no amount of tisanship. Without entering this controversy, the following observations may be safely made. Some degree of deterrence is probably inherent in compensatory damages.3 4 The quantum, however, is uncertain. What is even more uncertain is the extent of additional deterrence which is socially necessary or desirable and the amount of punitive-exemplary damages necessary to insure that additional deterrence. Thus, three layers of unknown variable quantities underlie the doctrine of punitive-exemplary damages. When one notes that these uncertainties are overlaid by the shifting feelings and sentiments of jurors, one may well be skeptical of the results flowing from the doctrine.
3 5 Although damages are not ordinarily susceptible to mechanical measurement, experience, common sense, and external tests are helpful. Such tools, however, are of little avail in fixing punitive-exemplary damages. The principle-sufficient to deter but not to oppress-is too shadowy a measure to effect a rational determination of punitive-exemplary damages.
3 6 The amount may vary from time to time and from place to place. It may depend upon such factors as the mores of the community, different rules of evidence, and the sympathy or distaste for the defendant. 3 7 Jurors in a comadmonishment, no amount of punishment, no type of social censure is an effective deterrent to drunken drivers." Dr. James L. Malfetti, quoted in N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1961, p. 37, col. 2. Difficult as it is to trace the relationship between punishment and deterrence in criminal proceedings, the difficulty is compounded in civil proceedings. Whether a particular state decrees capital punishment for a premeditated murder is fairly common knowledge among the residents of that state. But whether a particular state sanctions punitive-exemplary damages is probably known to few outside the legal profession in that state. For effective deterrence-assuming a nexus between punishment and deterrence-prior awareness of the law is desirable, albeit not always, sufficient. Ignorance of the law, however, may negate deter- 37 Stewart v. Maddox, 63 Ind. 51, 57 (1878). The history of fixing damages in cases of fraud and gross negligence in Roman law is of interest here. In those cases, the "plaintiff •.. was permitted himself to swear to the amount of injury sustained; and there seems originally to have been no check oh this prerogative .... [B]ut this license was restrained by positive provisions, which gave the power of assessment to the judex. To check still more effectually the abuses ... various statutory provisions were introduced, and an effort was made to obviate the difficulty by fixed valuations not to be departed from." I SEDGWICK 17. The element of caprice and untrustworthiness in damage awards is an age-old problem. munity hostile to certain minority groups, to unions, to "outsiders," or to a particular class may award specially large damages against members of such groups. At best, such awards generally are haphazard. That such awards may reflect excesses and injustice rather than reasonable admonition should, therefore, not be surprising.
"Anomalous" 38 as this doctrine is, it has spawned further anomalies by an almost ineluctable process. While an innocent injured plaintiff may claim compensation as a legal right, he has no such right to punitive-exemplary damages, however extreme the defendant's conduct and however meritorious the plaintiff's case. The option is entirely the jury's to award or not to award such damages-to open or not to open Pandora's box. The jury may find overwhelming evidence of wantonness, malice or indifference to consequences; yet it may without any reason refuse to award punitive-exemplary damages. 39 No judge may deprive a jury of that right. 40 This absolute, legally unfettered discretion vested in a jury-tantamount to legally sanctioned anarchy-is rare in our civil procedure.
This 40 "mhe trier of fact is not required to award punitive damages in a case where they are permissible and it is error for a trial judge to instruct the jury that punitive damages must be given. 42 "Let the criminal law deal with the criminal, and administer punishment for the legitimate purpose and end of punishment-namely, the reformation of the offender and the safety of the people. Let the individual, whose rights are infringed and who has suffered injury, go to the civil courts and there obtain full and ample reparation and compensation; but let him not thus obtain the 'fruits' to which he is not entitled, and which belong to others." Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 397 (1873). It is an understatement to call the distinction between punitive and compensatory damages "a modem refinement" as Mr. Justice Stone did in Pizitz Co. v. Yeldell, 274 U.S. 112, 116 (1927) . Occasionally, the controversy on punitive-exemplary damages has been described as one of "terminology of the law, rather than as to the extent of the right of recovery or the real measure of damages. to be better equipped by training, experience and objectivity. 4 4 Furthermore, as additional protection to the defendant, the judge's discretion is controlled by, and contained within, fixed bounds set by the legislature, presumably after careful study of the social needs of the community. In the punitive-exemplary damage proceeding, it is the jury who decides, without the benefit of a prior legislative determination, whether punitive-exemplary damages should or should not be awarded and in what amount. Twelve men, deliberating secretly, have the vast power of fixing dollar punishment 4 5 which in criminal law is left to legislatures and judges. Consequently, each new suit becomes a case of first impression for legislating punishment by each jury. 46 Unlike the legislative bodies which have the benefit of a mass of relevant material and experts in fixing punishment, an ad hoc jury has little more than its feelings and sentiments to guide them. Thus, the doctrine decreeing punishment evades basic safeguards of criminal procedure. Such rough and chaotic justice can be justified, if at all, only by an overriding necessity and outstanding effectiveness. The necessity is problematical; the effectiveness is dubious.
It is urged that a judge can, by his charge to the jury, effectively check a jury's prejudice or abuses. That is expecting too much. The charge generally tends to be an arid abstract proposition of law. Its objectivity-however profuse-rarely illuminates or guides juries. 47 As between an abstract proposition of law couched in conventional text book legal terms and an immediate deep-seated emotional drive, there can be little doubt which will prevail. Individual or local prejudice will not be distracted by an intellectual discourse on abstract legal principles. Crass partisanship can defeat justice and still not be within the cognizance of a judge. The judge cannot give the jury any practicable criterion beyond suggesting that it is for the jury to determine what will be sufficient to punish the defendant and to deter others. That task would be exceedingly onerous and challenging for an outstandingly equipped judge. As Mr. Justice Holmes said in another context: "To 44 "But a judge has wider experience with wrongdoers and is familiar with the normal scope and size of awards. The flexibility which exemplary damages bring to the admonitory function of tort law can better be achieved by the judge than by the jury." Note, 70 HARV. L. RE,. 517, 530 (1957). But even judges have been criticized for the erratic character of their sentences for comparable crimes. So serious is the situation that the United States Attorney General felt it necessary to point out that inconsistent sentences are "inflaming" rather than "healing" the underlying social "cancer" that leads to organized crime. N.Y. Times, Oct. 46 Stewart v. Maddox, 63 Ind. 51 (1878). The plaintiff's complaint sets the limits of damages. This is a modified throwback to early Roman law when the plaintiff himself was permitted to swear to the amount of injury sustained. See note 37 supra.
47 FRANKFURTER, op. cit. supra note 43, at 83. The judge's charge on punitiveexemplary damages in the Russell case, running to about a thousand words, was so general that it might have been taken baldly from a treatise on damages. Record, pp. 631-33. measure them justly needs not only the highest powers of a judge and a training which the practice of the law does not insure, but also a freedom from prepossessions which is very hard to attain." 48 Yet the doctrine expects such "powers" and "training" and "freedom from prepossession" from an ad hoc jury of twelve men. It is also urged that a court may reverse a jury's award when, in its opinion, it is excessive. 49 Although judges have not, gone so far as Lord Chief
Justice Pratt, who would reverse only if the damages were so "monstrous and enormous indeed, and such as all mankind must be ready to exclaim against, at first blush,"50 still reversals are rare. 5 1 More often than not, jury awards of such damages are deemed oracles and sacrosanct, and are rarely modified.
Further, it has been suggested that a plaintiff might not bring suit unless he could claim punitive-exemplary damages also. 52 (1914) . On the issue of the character of jury awards of punitive-exemplary damages, statements by text writers cover a wide spectrum. On the one hand: "The reported cases offer many interesting instances of startlingly large verdicts for punitive damages, and the function of judicial review of the jury's 'rough justice,' as meted out under its punitive power, must in general be one of considerable difficulty." MCCORmICK 278. But he says that unjustifiable awards rarely "escape correction." Ibid. "The amount of damages which may be assessed in a proper case under the head of exemplary damages is in a measure arbitrary. The jufy may do what they please, and their verdict is subject to revision only in case of a palpable miscarriage of justice." 1 STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 488 (1906 53 "Perhaps, the principal advantage [of punitive-exemplary damages] is that it does tend to bring to punishment a type of cases of oppressive conduct, such as slanders, assaults, minor oppressions, and cruelties, which are theoretically criminally punishable, but which in actual practice go unnoticed by prosecutors occupied with more serious crimes." Mc-CORMICK 276. "If an act is particularly wrongful, society imposes criminal sanctions in order to deter the wrongdoer and others from repeating the offense. But while some faults, such as ordinary negligence, should be discouraged, they do not warrant the stigma and severity of criminal punishment." Note, 70 HARv. L. REV. 517, 523 (1957). The difficulty proceed by criminal process in a particular situation, either because it is too trivial or because he is occupied with more serious crimes, his decision, rather than that of a private plaintiff might well prevail. If a conscientious and dedicated prosecutor thinks that the threat to the well being of the community from particular conduct is too slight to warrant protective criminal action, his decision should not be negated or overruled by a private plaintiff whose decision may be determined primarily by zeal for personal gain rather than protection of society. At all events, the burden of establishing the social utility of private prosecution must be borne by the supporterg of the doctrine. This burden has not been discharged.
This aspect of the problem would not merit such attention if it had not been suggested that, Although in practice it may not always be possible to avoid excessive punishment, the risk of such punishment is outweighed [sic] by the likelihood that the reluctance of prosecutors to press charges for minor offenses would allow some wrongdoers to escape adequate punishment if exemplary damages were abolished.
54
There is no sound reason to suppose that the only choices are either no punishment or excessive punishment for minor offenses. If, however, these were the only choices-and they are not, as we shall see later-much could be said for permitting minor offenses to go unpunished rather than risking excessive punishment whether in many or few cases. Such a choice would appear to be more'consonant with traditional concepts of justice than the converse. Minor offenses scarcely necessitate a slavish adherence to a doctrine which stemmed from the deprivation of an individual's revered rights. There is no need to use a tank to crush a mouse.
Furthermore, the doctrine "seems to be the only practice (apart from the double and triple damage statute cases)" in which jury awards result in "an out and out windfall to the plaintiff."
55 Even under those multiple damage statutes, before damages may be doubled or tripled, actual base damages must be initially ascertained. 5 6 Such base damages are compensatory and are founded on a record susceptible to evaluation and not on undisclosed feelings and sentiments. Moreover, the punitive damages are defined and limited. Conwith this position is that even though "ordinary negligence should be discouraged," it should not be the basis for punitive-exemplary damages. If the wrong is more serious than ordinary negligence, and if no criminal prosecution is warranted, why give a jury this practically uncontrolled latitude of fixing punishment? 54 Note, 70 HARv. L. REv. 517, 525 (1957). 55 Morris, supra note 2, at 1177 n.7. The statutory device of double or triple damages is used in nearly every state. It has a history of many centuries. See Note, 70 HARv. L. R~v.
517, 518 (1957).
56 Occasionally the actual damage sustained by plaintiff may be greater than he can establish in court. In such cases, the additional damages make up for that inability. 
1962] PUNITIVE-EXEMPLARY DAMAGES IN LABOR RELATIONS 471
sequently, the opportunity for caprice and prejudice in those situations is materially circumscribed. In the absence of those statutes which legislatures deemed of special public interest, it is difficult to understand why instituting an action should warrant a windfall. In those circumstances, compensating a plaintiff fully should be adequate. It is questionable whether the public interest requires further rewards. 57 It is urged that a special class of cases require remedial action beyond purely compensatory damages. They include cases in which the loss to the plaintiff is small but the wrong particularly offensive. In another group of cases, a defendant may find it more profitable to commit and pay for the wrong. 58 True, the compensatory damages in those cases may be too slight to warrant the expense of instituting an action or ineffective to prevent a repetition of the wrong. Here, as in the case of the minor offenses referred to above, a solution is provided by the so-called Connecticut rule. A contrary view is justified as follows: "Awarding exemplary damages to the state might permit the jury to take a more objective view of the defendant's motives and conduct, divorced from sympathy or distaste for the plaintiff. However, the subsidiary functions of exemplary damages-compensation and revenge-seem to justify making the award to the plaintiff even though it may be largely a windfall." Note, 70 HARv. L. REV. 517, 525 (1957). Anti-trust cases may be cited as an example of private individuals supplementing the activities of public prosecutors. But such cases are not ordinarily minor. And, more importantly, such litigation has been expressly declared to be so much in the public interest that a specific and limited reward is fixed for successful prosecution.
58 See note 28 supra. also satisfy the emotional drive of those plaintiffs who do not choose to depend on a public prosecutor or police force to bring a defendant to book without exposing such defendant to excessive punishment or unbridled caprice.
II.
The second of the two questions posed at the outset of this paper must now be examined: does the doctrine have any legitimate place in litigation involving labor relations? An answer is facilitated by noting the existing exceptions to the enforcement of the doctrine. According to the Restatement of Contracts, "punitive damages are not recoverable for breach of contract." 60 A leading authority expresses the rationale of this conclusion as follows:
The denial of such recovery in cases of contract probably flows first from a desire to restrict the field of exemplary damages, the allowance of which is usually regarded as an anomaly, and, second, from a belief that, since the vast majority of breaches of contract are due to inability or to erroneous beliefs as to the scope of the obligation, it is doubtful wisdom to add to the risks imposed on entering into a contract this liability to an acrimonious contest over whether a breach was malicious or fraudulent and the danger of a large and undefined recovery of punitive damages.
1
If it is doubtful wisdom to expose parties to a contract to "the danger of a large and undefined recovery of punitive damages," it would seem even more doubtful wisdom to do so in the case of an employer and his workers and their representatives. A commercial contract does not ordinarily have the quality of continuity and personal relationship present in a labor-management situation.
It has been said that "the general purpose underlying the law of damages, whether they are given for a breach of contract or for a tort, is to promote security and to prevent disorder." 62 Yet, if the attainment of those ends does 60 § 342, at 561 (1932). 61 "McCoRMICK 291. One court refused to award punitive-exemplary damages for the defendant's breach of contract to pay a money debt, even though this defendant sought to embarrass the plaintiff financially and to affect its credit standing. J. J. White, Inc. v. Metropolitan Merchandise Mart, Inc., 48 Del. 526, 107 A.2d 892, (1954) . See also 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1077 (Supp. 1961, at 48). Cf. Note, 70 HARv. L. REV. 517, 532 (1957): "Since a malicious breach of contract may be as wrongful and deserving of punishment as an intentional tort, allowing exemplary damages would have the socially desirable effect of discouraging such breaches of contract." The author of the Note supports the award of punitiveexemplary damages in such cases on the ground that injury to the plaintiff may exceed the recoveries under the usual contract theories of damages. That view might be defensible if punitive-exemplary damages were limited (in that case) to an amount necessary to compensate. But the function of punitive-exemplary damages is not so limited. not require the award of punitive-exemplary damages for breach of contract, one may ask why they are required in tort actions. This question is even more pertinent when one notes that the law of torts goes beyond that of contracts in carving out exceptions-exceptions even in the area of compensatory damages. A distinguished authority in the field of torts expressed this rationale as follows: "Mhe primary conception of the obligation in torts is to refrain from injurious action, unless the doing of the act, even with its attendant risk, is so beneficial to the public generally, the object of it so valuable to the general welfare, that even private injury must be borne to encourage it."63
In the service of valuable public welfare, one is privileged knowingly to infict temporal damage. 64 Since, in such a situation, compensatory damages are denied, punitive-exemplary damages are also barred.
The sturdy, indeed phenomenal, growth of our modern economic system has occurred in a climate characterized by the struggle between management and labor. Some harm is an unavoidable by-product of such conflict and the loss is allowed to lie where it falls.
65 "[E]conomic loss inevitably attends work stoppages."
66 Indeed, the pervasiveness of this struggle coupled with the vital need for stability in labor-management relations necessitated intervention by the Congress in balancing the competing claims of management and labor. Congress has chosen to subordinate its concern with an employer's economic loss to the protection of workers' rights to bargain collectively and to strike. Fearful of chaos, Congress has set up an elaborate regulative scheme watched over by a special administrative agency. Rights, duties, privileges, prohibitions and procedures were spelled out in considerable detail. By these measures, Congress sought in an orderly fashion to limit the impact of the struggle, to expedite the disposition of labor disputes, and to insure uniformity of results.
67
The necessity of federal legislation is dramatically evidenced by the Russell case. A strike was called. The union involved was one of the leading responsible labor organizations in this country. One may reasonably assume that the strike, in the opinion of the union, was called in the best interests of its members.
BOHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS 62 (1926).
64 The existence of the privilege and how far it shall be allowed are matters of legislative policy. See HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 119 (1920). 65 This was recognized by Congress when it passed the Clayton Act, in answer to those who sought to make labor unions subject to the provisions of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. The strikers sought to make their strike effective by attracting as many adherents to their point of view as possible and keeping as many non-strikers as possible away from the plant. If enough workers returned to permit uninterrupted production, the strike might fail. Had the strikers limited themselves to peaceful persuasion, and had the non-strikers stayed away from the plant, or had the employer shut down the plant, then no worker could have recovered damages for loss of wages. Neither could the employer have recovered anything, even though it could demonstrate economic loss as a result of the strike. 68 But the jury found evidence of intimidation and threats of violence on the part of some strikers against some non-strikers. 9 Such threats, being unlawful, gave rise to legal liability. They annulled the privilege to cause temporal damage to non-strikers.
Russell, a non-striker seeking to return to work, was deprived of the privilege of working for five weeks. He lost $500 in wages. He was entitled to be made whole, that is, to recover the wages which he lost, but he was awarded $10,000:70 compensation five per cent; punishment and deterrence ninety-five per cent. Thus, he received a "windfall" of $9,500, the equivalent of almost two years' wages. Despite the defendants' objections, the Alabama Supreme Court justified the award in the light of "the necessity of preventing similar wrongs... [as] we must do. . ."71 Yet other legal tools-more appropriate and swifter-were readily available to prevent similar wrongs without oppressing defendants or unjustly enriching plaintiffs. The majority of the United States Supreme Court sustained the Alabama court's holding without more than "punitive damages constitute a well-settled form of relief under the law of Alabama when there is a willful and malicious wrong."
72 Chief Justice Warren, in his dissenting opinion, argued that the award of damages in a state court frustrated the policies of Congressional legislation and had "an unfavorable effect upon the uniformity the Act sought to achieve." He added: By approving a state-court damage award for conduct regulated by the Taft-Hartley Act, the majority assures that the consequences of violating 68 It is assumed-and there is no evidence to indicate the contrary-that the strike was not in violation of a contractual obligation. An employee who was wrongfully discharged was disallowed punitive-exemplary damages. 
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the Federal Act will vary from State to State with the availability and constituent elements of a given right of action and the procedures and rules of evidence essential to its vindication. The matter of punitive damages is an example, though by no means the only one. 73 We are not here dealing with the respective roles of state and federal jurisdiction or the virtues of uniformity. Neither are we evaluating the role of trade unions in our society. We are concerned for the moment only with the legitimacy of the doctrine of punitive-exemplary damages in a tense, feverishly disturbed labor-management situation. This demands awareness of and obeisance to the complexity of human motives and the clash of interests in a strike. On one side are workers struggling to protect their jobs and improve their standards. On the other is the employer who seeks to keep costs down and to maintain or improve his competitive position. Also, there are the non-strikers whose paramount concern is the possible loss of wages. Thus, there are three parties intimately and directly involved, participating, and clashing-in one form or another-in a strike.
A strike presents the mystery of human dilemmas. The non-striker must choose between losing his wages or returning to work. Should he choose to return he must know that his conduct may impede the objectives of the strikers. He is unlike the innocent and passive bystander in the crowd into which a wanton wrongdoer shoots. By his affirmative choice to return to work, he, in effect, sides with the employer and, psychologically speaking, provokes the strikers. The privilege or liberty to return to work remains unimpaired, 7 4 but provocation is a natural result of his conduct. Scabbing to a striker is as much a provocation as the proverbial red flag to the bull.
That strikers will respond to the hostile action of the non-strikers is natural, reasonable, and inevitable. What is uncertain is the nature of the response. Here the strikers too face a dilemma. Will their response be limited to a reluctant passive acceptance of the non-strikers' return to work which may defeat the strike? If peaceful persuasion be not effective, will the urge to make the strike succeed become so obsessive as to cause strikers to resort to minatory tactics? Dilemmas in a strike are not always met with detachment and reason, despite any instructions from top union leadership to exercise restraint.
In a strike, it is not uncommon for tempers to flare and emotions to rise to frenetic heights. It is the rare judge who sees that "men become earnest and excited and vigorous at such times.... The fervor of argument is upon them. tion men always employ strong words-the nomenclature of the strike is not the language of the parlor. ' 75
Apparently the trial judge in the Russell case was not one of those "rare judges" who are aware of the bitterness, the partisanship, and the passions of a labor controversy. Presumably forgetting that parties in a strike are something less than saints, he instructed the jury that if "the defendant was actuated by malice and actuated by ill-will, committed the unlawful and wrongful acts alleged, you, in addition to the actual damages, if any, may give damages, for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant for the purpose of making the defendant smart... . "76 It transcends human nature and conducl for strikers to be actuated by anything other than "ill-will" against a nonstriker seeking to return to work and thereby imperiling the hopes of the strikers. To expect any other emotion from strikers is to expect a miracle. The very atmosphere of a strike seethes with strife and ill will-striker pitted against non-striker, striker against employer, and employer against striker.
Yet not a word of this drama was included in the judge's charge. Instead, he charged the jury that malice could "be implied from the intentional doing of the wrongful act."
77 He sanctioned this implication despite the grave doubts that the acts of the strikers were committed out of pure malice and spite. 78 The contrary implication may be more reasonable. The action of a striker, passionately and sincerely determined to elevate his standards and to prevent a nonstriker from returning to work, is generally a far cry from ordinary wanton conduct. It may be unlawful, but it is neither necessarily nor implicitly wanton, malicious, or spiteful. Indeed, in many cases, the strikers may be animated not exclusively by personal interest but also by the urge to help all the workers in the plant, including the non-strikers. That the latter disagree or do not welcome such offer of help does not negate these motives of the strikers. 79 In any event, the issue is not so simple or plain that it warrants without more a 76 Record, p. 631. (Emphasis added.) When the term malice is used, it is meant to signify "that the harm is wished for its own sake, or, as Austin would say with more accuracy, for the sake of the pleasurable feeling which knowledge of the suffering caused by the act would excite." HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 52 (1881). "1 mean by malice, a malevolent motive for action, without reference to any hope of a remoter benefit to oneself to be accomplished by the intended harm to another." HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 118-19 (1920).
77
The extent of the unawareness of the trial court judge of the complex elements in a strike is evidenced by the instruction which he gave at the plaintiff's request. "Malice may be implied from the intentional doing of a wrongful act; and if you are reasonably satisfied from the evidence that the defendants intentionally committed the wrongful acts charged in the complaint then I charge you that said acts were maliciously done-and you may award punitive damages." Record, p. 634. Euclidian conclusion that an intentional wrongful act is ipsofacto also malicious. The problem is sufficiently complex to require a deep understanding of the motives underlying the acts. Without this empathy, justice is sterile.
One further fact must be noted. Strikes generally are settled after a time and strikers and non-strikers return to work. What kind of harmony or stability can the employer expect from returning strikers when they are to work with non-strikers who have cost their union and a fellow officer large punitiveexemplary damages? This situation does not contribute to the stable, secure, and law-abiding society which the doctrine of punitive-exemplary damages is supposedly designed to further.
It has been suggested that exceptions have been carved out of the doctrine of punitive-exemplary damages.
8 0 We come now to an exception in ordinary tort litigation well-established in the very states which adhere to the doctrine. When two parties scrap, the fever and ill-will not infrequently engendered by and associated with such squabbles are overlooked for purposes of determining punitive damages. Such feelings are not ignored when one is injured suddenly and without provocation by a "malicious" wrongdoer.
As Sedgwick, one of the most vigorous supporters of the doctrine, stated it: "The existence of provocation, though it may not be a defence, will prevent the allowance of exemplary damages. ... So in an action of assault and battery the fact that the injury was inflicted during a mutual fight will prevent the allowance of exemplary damages." 8 1 Certainly, strikes afford vivid examples of "a mutual fight" between strikers and non-strikers.
Sedgwick adds that the provocation "must have been so recent that the act can be said to have been committed under the immediate influence of feelings excited.... And it must have been sufficient to have stirred some degree of resentment in an ordinary man." 2 Mr. Justice Holmes' lapidary wisdom may also come to our assistance at this point. He said: "According to current morality, a man is not so much to blame for an act done under the disturbance of great excitement, caused by a wrong done to himself, as when he is calm. The law is made to govern men through their motives, and it must, therefore, take their mental constitution into account." 8 3
In the Russell case, provocation was recent; indeed, it was contemporaneous; feelings of resentment were stirred, as they would be "in an ordinary man." The acts of the strikers were sparked by what they conceived to be wrongs done to them. All the elements essential to bar punitive-exemplary damages appear to have been present in the strike in the Russell case. Although the strikers, in the circumstances, could not have properly pleaded provocation as a defense to an action for compensatory damages, they would have been entitled to allege and show provocation as a bar to the award of punitiveexemplary damages. The jury in the Russell case was not adequately instructed on that point.84 Had provocation been demonstrated, that alone might well have averted an oppressive judgment on the defendants and a windfall for the plaintiff.
8 5
The vice of the doctrine is deepened when we note that twenty-nine other suits were brought against the union for similar activities in the Russell strike. All sought punitive-exemplary damages, 8 6 aggregating approximately $1, 500,000. Some resulted in punitive-exemplary damage awards. Others were awaiting the decision of the United States Supreme Court. The multiplicity of suits raises the question whether punitive-exemplary damages may be awarded to a number of plaintiffs for what is substantially the same objectionable conduct. Intimidation or threats of violence to each non-striker are a separate wrong, and separate liability for compensation arises in each case. However, since the underlying purposes of the doctrine are punishment and deterrence, the real party in interest is the public and not each individual plaintiff. Since the gravamen or gist of the continuing conduct complained of is, in substance, the same, the doctrine would appear to be fully served by assessing punitiveexemplary damages on the basis of conduct rather than on the fortuitous number of plaintiffs. Conduct may be aggravated by the number of people affected thereby, but not necessarily in a precise mathematical fashion determined by the number of plaintiffs. Consequently, when the trial judge in the Russell case charged "that the amount of the [punitive-exemplary] damages should not be 84 Although the judge in his charge to the jury briefly referred in another context to the fact that prov6cation may be of a kind "sufficient to prevent an award of exemplary damages," he did not elaborate or deal with it in a sufficiently explicit manner. Record, pp. 630, 631, 633. In the circumstances, one may doubt whether the jury gave adequate consideration to the question of the sufficiency of such provocation to generate the particular response from the strikers. See Brown v. Swineford, 44 Wis. 282, 289, 290 (1878). (1935) . A curious result may follow. Those who are most likely to be deterred may protect themselves, whereas the individual entirely unaware of the doctrine, will neither be deterred by nor insured against that hazard.
86 In Russell, each of the plaintiffs in the thirty suits sought damages of $50,000. In two cases, awards of $10,000 were made and in a third case, the award amounted to $18,450. 356 U.S. at 657.
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diminished" because there were many other similar suits pending against the defendants,87 he was demonstrating one of the most oppressive excrescences of the doctrine. Even in criminal law, when a defendant has been convicted of more than one crime, the judge has the option-of mitigating or intensifying the punishment by ordering sentences to run concurrently or consecutively. 88 But the jury, the sentencing agency in the Russell case, was denied the choice of diminishing individual punitive awards when the same objectionable conduct affected more than one person. Punitive-exemplary damages to each of twenty-nine plaintiffs may spell harsh oppression rather than reasonable admonition. Windfalls are bountifully distributed and substantially beyond the -needs of deterrence. Excessive multiplication may defeat justice. 89 When a most powerful weapon is used in this manner, on one side of an intense social struggle, skepticism regarding law's fair dealing is to be expected. This result is particularly unfortunate when liability is imposed on a principal. According to Sedgwick, it is the better opinion that no recovery of exemplary damages can be had against a principal for the tort of an agent or servant unless the defendant expressly authorized the act that was performed or approved it, or was grossly negligent in hiring the agent or servant, or in not preventing him from committing the act.... The burden of showing authorization or approval by the principal is on the plaintiff.
9
The court's prolix charge in the Russell case on the liability of the union for the acts of its "agents" was extremely general and abstruse. To the jury, such abstractions must have been an impenetrable thicket. What, if anything, the jury could make of it is very questionable. That the award reflected an understanding of the subtle principles involved in the charge is open to grave doubt.
Moreover, the judge failed to charge the jury that the "burden of showing authorization or approval by the principal is on the plaintiff." 9 1 This is not a perfunctory omission; such a burden is dictated by experience. 92 To elicit the truth about the activities and motives of men in a strike is one of the most difficult tasks assigned to courts. Industrial relations disputes generate the most sensitive contact between law and emotion. Tempers are frayed and feelings are at a high pitch. In a strike, "feelings on both sides are necessarily wrought up, and the desire for victory is likely to obscure nice moral questions and poison the minds of men by prejudice." 93 So spoke one of the most perceptive judges who graced the federal bench.
All that has just been said about the difficulties and the burden of proof resting on the plaintiff is particularly intensified in the realm of punitive-exemplary damages. When juries may permit personal quirks to intrude, not to mention prejudice, then it is especially important for courts themselves to look to the quality and genuineness of the proof. 94 Merely being "reasonably satis-fled," as the court instructed the jury in the Russell case, may not be enough for such awards. Anything less than clear proof fully sustaining the plaintiff's burden may result in juries awarding punitive-exemplary damages when they are more interested in keeping unions out of the area than in rendering a fair judgment on the facts. There may be shades of opinion as to the social utility of trade unions in our society. There is little, if any, basis to warrant endowing local ad hoc juries with the power to decide whether unions may function freely or under potentially harsh handicaps. This is a matter of serious legislative policy for the Congress of the United States to decide and local juries should not be permitted to arrogate to themselves that right under the guise of awarding punitive-exemplary damages. Such a doctrine can scarcely be said to contribute to stability in our society. It has been said that our "underlying philosophies of liability are in a state of flux."95 In those circumstances, it is appropriate to inquire whether the doctrine of punitive-exemplary damages justifies itself. There is not much evidence that juries can exercise and utilize this device with proper responsibility, clarity, or detachment. The role of bias and caprice might be dangerously elevated. A defendant can become a helpless prey and a sport of prejudice. Violating modem social needs, the doctrine encourages complex neurotic disturbances instead of desensitizing them. It does not submit itself to reasonable discipline demanded by legal process. The exceptional cases in which compensatory damages are slight but the need for imposing liability on a defendant is exigent may be dealt with by requiring the defendant to pay all plaintiff's legal costs and expenses.
A distinguished philosopher said: "To be ruled by a judge is, to the extent that he is not bound by law, tyranny or despotism."9 6 How much more tyrannous and despotic is it to be subject to the undisciplined rule of juries which the doctrine of punitive-exemplary damages legalizes.
If the doctrine is to be continued, stringent efforts should be made to make such awards as scientific as possible. The cloak of sanctity should be removed from awards that often are begrimed with conscious and unconscious prejudice. They should be based on the maximum information available respecting 95 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS 1232 (1956). The following statement from a staunch supporter of the doctrine is worth noting: "If it had been practicable for the judges to analyze and define for the jury with precision all the elements of legal harm which enter into every case, there would have been no necessity for the recognition of the idea of punishment as a proper end in the administration of the law of civil wrong. But they did not essay this task and it was felt that the jury should be left to deal with the undefined factors of harm with a pretty free hand. The doctrine of exemplary damages answered this end well enough for practical purposes and hence gained currency. As our theory of wrong catches up with the law of damages, the idea of punishment will appear more and more out of place in the civil system, and it may possibly in time altogether disappear." STREET, Op. cit. hupra note 51, at 488. the relationship of punishment to deterrence. That is the tendency in criminal law today,9 7 and it should certainly be extended to civil proceedings. If the problem is hopeless, then the Connecticut rule should be adopted. In any event, the doctrine should not be extended to labor relations cases. Since strikes present particularly serious difficulties of proof, inter alia, as to agency and provocation, and since the doctrine is studded with so many anomalies and incongruities, the abandonment of the doctrine in labor relations cases might well be justified, at least in the interest of "workable simplicity." 9 8 Otherwise, the doctrine will only exacerbate labor-management relations and threaten stability in our society. There may still be an adequate residuum of admonition in compensatory damages to serve the legitimate aims of tort liability.
97 See Economist, November 11, 1961, p. 532.
